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THE COMFORT OF HOME: WHY PERUTA v. 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO’S EXTENSION OF 
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS GOES 
BEYOND THE SCOPE ENVISIONED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT 
Abstract: On February 13, 2014, in Peruta v. County of San Diego, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the scope of the Second 
Amendment to cover the public carry of handguns. Extending the scope of the 
Second Amendment caused the Ninth Circuit to apply the incorrect standard of 
scrutiny in analyzing the challenged gun regulation. This Comment argues that 
the Ninth Circuit’s overzealous extension of the scope of the Second Amendment 
is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, its own precedent in United States v. Chovan, and the approach taken by 
its sister circuits. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that the right 
to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.1 Since the ratification of the Bill 
of Rights, there has been much debate about the scope of the Second Amend-
ment.2 Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller ruled that the Second Amendment codified a preexisting, individual 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.3 In so holding, the Court noted 
that the right to bear arms is not an absolute right, and it is well-settled that 
firearms may be reasonably regulated, especially outside the home.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 2 See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). The major competing view-
points regarding the scope of the Second Amendment are based on the language of the amendment’s 
prefatory clause and the operative clause. See id. (addressing the two competing readings of the Sec-
ond Amendment). The predominant view throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was that 
the Second Amendment protected the collective rights of states to organize militias and of individuals 
to possess and carry firearms in connection with militia service. See, e.g., Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 
478 F.3d 370, 380 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2007) aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. The opposing view, 
recently adopted by the Supreme Court in Heller, is that the Second Amendment protects an individu-
al right to possess a firearm unconnected with militia service for presumptively lawful purposes (self-
defense). Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; Parker, 478 F.3d at 370, 380 & n.6. 
 3 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that 
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 4 Id. The Heller majority compared the exercise of the Second Amendment to the exercise of the 
First Amendment. Id. (“Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to 
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In early 2014, in Peruta v. County of San Diego, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the constitutionality of a gun regulation 
that appellant claimed infringed on his Second Amendment right to carry a 
handgun in public for self-defense.5 California generally prohibits the open or 
concealed carry of a firearm in public, unless an individual is granted a permit 
to carry a concealed weapon (“CCW”), which requires the applicant to show 
“good cause.”6 After extensively analyzing the textual and historical scope of 
the Second Amendment, the Ninth Circuit held that the good cause require-
ment constituted a complete destruction of the right to bear arms and therefore 
did not pass constitutional muster under any level of scrutiny.7 
This Comment examines why the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that the core 
of the Second Amendment right extends beyond the home to cover the right to 
carry arms in public for self-defense is flawed and contravenes Supreme Court 
precedent.8 Part I of this Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s framework 
for analyzing Second Amendment claims and discusses the Peruta case within 
the context of California’s handgun regulatory scheme.9 Part II compares the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach to defining and analyzing the scope of the right to the 
approaches applied by other courts, including the Ninth Circuit’s prior ap-
proach in United States v. Chovan.10 Finally, Part III argues that in a rehearing 
en banc the Ninth Circuit should follow the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hel-
ler, its own precedent set in Chovan, and the trend of its sister circuits by exer-
cise judicial discretion in defining the scope of the Second Amendment and 
applying intermediate scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the CCW 
regulation.11 
                                                                                                                           
carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the 
right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”). Outside the home, the Second Amendment right to gun 
possession comes into conflict with the state’s police powers to protect the public safety. See Stephen 
Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. 
REV. 1131, 1161 (2011). 
 5 Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 6 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25400, 25605, 25850, 26150, 26155, 26350 (2012). California law dele-
gates to each county the power to define the policy for obtaining a CCW. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. 
San Diego County’s policy interpreted good cause as “a set of circumstances that distinguish the ap-
plicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be placed in harm’s way.” Id. 
 7 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170–72; see infra note 37 (discussing the three levels of scrutiny to consti-
tutional challenges). 
 8 See infra notes 12–89 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–31 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 32–65 and accompanying text. 
 11 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; see infra notes 66–89 and accompanying text. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court set the stage for this constitutional challenge in Dis-
trict of Colombia v. Heller.12 Section A of this Part discusses how the Supreme 
Court defined the scope of the Second Amendment in Heller.13 Section B trac-
es Peruta’s case from his application for a CCW permit to his appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.14 
A. Supreme Court Defines Scope of Right in the Home, Leaves Ambiguity 
for Interpretation of Right to Bear Arms in Public 
In 2008, in United States v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
District of Columbia’s total ban on handgun possession in the home violated 
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in the home.15 In so con-
cluding, the Court used a two-part analysis: (1) whether having operable hand-
guns in the home amounted to “keep[ing] and bear[ing] arms” within the 
meaning of the Second Amendment; and (2) whether the challenged law in-
fringed the right.16 The Court held that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to have operable handguns in the home and that D.C.’s total ban on hand-
gun possession in the home amounted to a complete destruction of that Second 
Amendment right.17 A few years after Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
Illinois, the Supreme Court clarified that the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms extends to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 15–31 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 15–20 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 21–31 and accompanying text. 
 15 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[W]hatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above 
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home.”). The Heller Court narrowly held that the core right of the Second Amendment was the right 
to keep and bear arms in the home where the need for “defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute.” Id. at 628 (noting that the holding is confined to complete handgun prohibition in the home). 
 16 Id. at 576, 628. This analysis in Heller provided a framework for lower courts to follow in 
subsequent Second Amendment challenges. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–01 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (noting that Heller “points in a general direction” and does not leave us “without a frame-
work for how to proceed”); see also Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (“We apply [the approach in Heller] 
here, as we have done in the past, and as many of our sister circuits have done in similar cases.” (cit-
ing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013))). 
 17 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. The Court did not define the scope of the right to bear arms 
outside the home. Id. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of 
the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field, any more than . . . our first 
in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left that area in a state of utter certainty.” (citing Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879))). 
 18 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790–91 (2010) (“A provision of the Bill of Rights 
that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal 
Government and the States . . . therefore . . . the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”). The Court refused to treat the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a “second-class right, subject to an entirely differ-
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Neither case explicitly defined the scope of the Second Amendment right out-
side the home, or established a standard of review to determine what it would 
take to infringe that right.19 Nonetheless, both Heller and McDonald were clear 
that the scope of the Second Amendment right to have and bear arms within 
the home is not subject to judicial interest balancing.20 
B. Peruta’s Application for a Concealed Weapons License and Subsequent 
Second Amendment Challenge 
California generally prohibits the open or concealed carry of a handgun in 
public locations.21 Citizens may, however, apply for a license to carry a con-
cealed weapon in the city or county in which one works or resides.22 To obtain 
a CCW, a citizen must meet several requirements and establish good cause for 
the permit.23 In San Diego County, the power to grant CCWs is vested in the 
                                                                                                                           
ent body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the 
Due Process Clause.” Id. at 780; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (holding that the Bill of 
Rights protections must “all . . . be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment ac-
cording to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment”); Todd 
E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1025 (2009) (noting 
the rationale behind the incorporation doctrine, that the Bill of Right’s provisions, the nation’s funda-
mental law, ought to place comparable restrictions on state and federal officials with respect to certain 
individual rights). McDonald also reaffirmed Heller’s assurances that many longstanding handgun 
regulations are presumptively lawful. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791; Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 19 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (“[N]either Heller nor McDonald speaks explicitly or precisely to 
the scope of the Second Amendment right outside the home or to what it takes to ‘infringe’ it.”); see 
also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 
(2013) (noting that this “vast ‘terra incognita’ has troubled courts since Heller was decided”). 
 20 Compare McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (noting that the Court has expressly rejected the argu-
ment that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by “judicial interest balanc-
ing”), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). The Heller dissent 
proposed adopting an interest-balancing approach where the judiciary would weigh the individual 
interest protected by the Second Amendment against the government interest in public-safety. Heller, 
554 U.S. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed Heller as a case that dealt with whether 
administrative proceedings violated the due process clause of the constitution, as an example of the 
Supreme Court applying an interest-balancing approach. Id. 
 21 CAL. PENAL CODE § 25400 (2012) (banning the unlawful concealed carry of a firearm); id. 
§ 25605 (exempting from Section 25400 a citizen who carries a firearm in the citizen’s residence, 
place of business, or private property owned by the citizen); id. § 25850 (listing the punishment for 
carrying a loaded firearm in public); id. § 26150 (covering the application process for obtaining a 
license to carry a concealed weapon); id. § 26155 (outlining the responsibilities of a county sheriff’s 
department for issuing a CCW); id. § 26350 (banning the open carry of a handgun in public); Peruta, 
742 F.3d at 1147. California’s policy favors concealed carry of a firearm over open carry, and only 
provides licensing procedures for concealed carry. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172. Open carry of a firearm, 
loaded or unloaded, is completely prohibited. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26350; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172. 
 22 CAL.PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. 
 23 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. One must also demonstrate 
“good moral character,” be a resident of or spend substantial time in the county in which he or she 
apply, and complete a specified training course. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155. 
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county sheriff’s department, which requires supporting documentation in order 
to satisfy the good cause requirement.24 If the applicant cannot demonstrate 
“circumstances that distinguish [him or her] from the mainstream,” then he or 
she will not be issued a CCW.25 Concern for personal safety alone is not con-
sidered good cause.26 
Edward Peruta, a resident of San Diego County, applied for a CCW for 
self-defense but was denied by the sheriff’s department of San Diego County 
because his documentation did not satisfy the good cause requirement.27 Sub-
sequent to filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of California against the sheriff and San Diego County, Peruta filed an amend-
ed complaint to add similarly situated plaintiffs who had applied for but were 
denied CCWs in San Diego County.28 After surviving a motion to dismiss, 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment.29 The district court, 
applying intermediate scrutiny, denied Plaintiffs’ motion holding that the coun-
ty’s CCW policy was reasonably related to the important governmental interest 
of public safety and reducing the rate of gun use in crime.30 Plaintiffs appealed 
to the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.31 
                                                                                                                           
 24 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. Applicants submit supporting 
documents, which may include restraining orders, or letters from law enforcement agencies or district 
attorneys familiar with the case. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. The County Sheriff discusses the documen-
tation with each applicant to determine whether he or she can show a pressing need for self-protection. 
Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (defining “good cause”). 
 25 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. Peruta, otherwise eligible to possess a firearm, owned a news and information company that 
gathered and provided raw, breaking news videos, photographs, and tips to media outlets. First 
Amended Complaint at 3, Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:09-cv-02371-IEG-BGS, 2010 WL 
10663415 (S.D. Cal. 2010). As part of his duties, he entered high crime areas. Id. 
 28 Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2010) rev’d and remand-
ed, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs included a hairdresser who carried large amounts of cash 
through high-crime neighborhoods, a retired Navy officer who was instructed by the Sheriff’s De-
partment that applying for a CCW would be a waste of time because he would not satisfy “good 
cause,” a medical physician who performed legal abortions and was the target of threats from anti-
abortion protestors, and a registered nurse who worked with legally insane populations and received 
death threats from patients. First Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 4–9. 
 29 Peruta, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Defendant William D. Gore’s Points & 
Auths. in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:09-cv-02371-
IEG-BGS (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2009) (arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because there is 
no constitutional right to carry concealed weapons in public); see also Memorandum of Points & 
Auths. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 1–3, Peruta v. Cnty. of San 
Diego, No. 3:09-cv-02371-IEG-BGS (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010). 
 30 Peruta, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–18 (“Intermediate scrutiny requires the asserted governmental 
end to be more than just legitimate; it must be either ‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important,’ and it 
requires the ‘fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective be reasonable, not per-
fect.’” (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 31 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1149. 
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II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FOR SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
To analyze the constitutionality of the “good cause” permitting regulation, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first had to define the scope of 
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and then scrutinize the 
challenged gun regulation.32 Section A of this Part summarizes the scope and 
standards of review applied to Second Amendment challenges by other cir-
cuits.33 Section B explores the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit when faced 
with a previous Second Amendment challenge.34 Lastly, Section C discusses 
the Ninth Circuit’s latest approach in Peruta v. County of San Diego.35 
A. The Circuit Court Split: Standard of Scrutiny Contingent on Court’s 
Analysis of Scope of Second Amendment Right 
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in District of Colombia v. 
Heller, lower courts have inconsistently grappled with whether state gun regu-
lations infringe on the Second Amendment right to bear arms outside the 
home.36 Courts have traditionally applied one of three standards of review to 
constitutional challenges: rational basis, strict scrutiny, or intermediate scruti-
ny.37 The Supreme Court in Heller was explicit, however, that rational basis 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 33 See infra notes 36–48 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text. 
 36 See supra notes 12–31 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s analysis and 
holding in Heller that a complete ban on handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment right 
to keep and bear arms); see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (prohibiting the 
carrying of guns in public by statute violated the Second Amendment in Illinois); cf. Drake v. Filko, 
724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (requiring applicant to demon-
strate “justifiable need” for permit to carry a handgun in public did not violate the Second Amendment 
in New Jersey); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 
(2013) (requiring showing of “good and substantial reason” for permit to carry handgun outside the 
home did not violate the Second Amendment in Maryland); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (requiring showing of “proper 
cause” to obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon in public did not violate the Second Amend-
ment in New York). 
 37 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). See generally Andrew Peace, Comment, 
A Snowball’s Chance in Heller: Why DeCastro’s Substantial Burden Standard is Unlikely to Survive, 
54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 175, 178 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/14, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/2L4S-AV6K (discussing the differences among the three standards of re-
view). Rational basis is the most deferential standard and requires only that a government action be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985) (applying rational basis scrutiny to constitutionality of zoning ordi-
nance adversely affecting the mentally challenged under the Equal Protection clause). Conversely, 
strict scrutiny requires that a regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government inter-
est. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based 
criteria in college admissions under the Equal Protection clause). Intermediate scrutiny lies some-
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review does not apply to Second Amendment challenges.38 In the Second 
Amendment context, the level of scrutiny applied to gun control regulations 
depends on the regulation’s burden on the core of the Second Amendment 
right.39 Thus, whether to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny turns on how a 
court defines the scope of the Second Amendment right outside the home.40 
Most courts have been hesitant to extend the core right of the Second 
Amendment expounded in Heller outside the home.41 These courts have 
acknowledged that in light of the Heller decision, there may logically be some 
application of the Second Amendment right to bear arms in public for self-
defense.42 Without further Supreme Court guidance, however, the courts have 
not thought it prudent to assert it as a core protection of the Second Amend-
ment.43 Indeed, in 2011, in United States v. Masciandaro, the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                                           
where in between rational basis and strict scrutiny and requires the government to demonstrate 1) that 
the objective of the action is important, and 2) that the relationship between the challenged action and 
the objective is reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications at a Virginia military college under the equal protection 
clause). 
 38 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear 
arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”). 
 39 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167–68. 
 40 See id. at 1167; United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
level of scrutiny should depend on (1) ‘how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amend-
ment right,’ and (2) ‘the severity of the law’s burden on the right.’” (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011))). 
 41 See, e.g., Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (“We reject Appellants’ contention that a historical analysis 
leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Second Amendment confers upon individuals a right to 
carry handguns in public for self-defense . . . . We do, however, recognize that the Second Amend-
ment’s individual right to bear arms may have some application beyond the home.”); Woollard, 712 
F.3d at 875–76 (“Accordingly, a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of [the 
Heller] right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether and how the right can be 
burdened by governmental regulation.” (internal quotations omitted)); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91 
(“History and tradition do not speak with one voice here. What history demonstrates is that states 
often disagreed as to the scope of the right to bear arms . . . .”). 
 42 Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (holding that the core of the Second Amendment right applies equally 
outside the home because “a right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the 
home”); cf. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (refusing to extend the core of the Second Amendment right out-
side the home, but recognizing that the Second Amendment right “may have some application beyond 
the home”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s analysis suggests . . . that the [Sec-
ond] Amendment must have some application in the very different context of the public possession of 
firearms.”). The core Second Amendment right expounded in Heller was the right to keep and bear 
arms “in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635; see also Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (“Heller 
tells us that the core of the Second Amendment is “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home.”) 
 43 See, e.g., Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (“For these reasons, we decline to definitively declare that the 
individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home, the “core of the 
right as identified by Heller.”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96 (refusing to extend the Second Amendment 
guarantees which are at their “zenith” in the home to public carry because state regulation of firearms 
in public was also enshrined within the scope of the Second Amendment when it was adopted); Unit-
58 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the serious dangers inherent in 
extending the scope of the right to bear arms too broadly.44 Therefore, the Sec-
ond, Third, and Fourth Circuits have decided to exercise judicial restraint in 
their decisions, and absent further Supreme Court guidance, have limited the 
core Second Amendment protection to the right to keep and bear arms within 
the home.45 
This reluctance to extend the core right espoused in Heller outside the 
home has caused many courts to apply intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict 
scrutiny, to state gun regulations.46 Intermediate scrutiny allows courts to deal 
with the fine line between the specific, enumerated right to keep and bear arms 
and the presumptively lawful regulations listed in Heller.47 In applying inter-
mediate scrutiny, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have upheld gun regu-
lations as constitutional.48 
B. Ninth Circuit Precedent: Approach in Chovan 
The Ninth Circuit previously faced a Second Amendment challenge to a 
gun regulation in 2013 in U.S. v. Chovan.49 The gun regulation challenged in 
Chovan was a federal statute that prohibited people convicted of domestic vio-
                                                                                                                           
ed States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e think it prudent to await direction 
from the [Supreme] Court itself.”). In this case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judg-
ment that “Heller’s dicta makes pellucidly clear that the Supreme Court’s holding should not be read 
by lower courts as an invitation to invalidate the existing universe of public weapons regulations.” 
United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 788 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 44 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 476 (noting the risk that [tragic acts of mayhem] “would rise expo-
nentially as one moved the right from the home to the public square”). 
 45 Drake, 724 F.3d at 440; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97–98. 
 46 See Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; Kiehl, su-
pra note 4, at 1145–46 (highlighting the struggle of lower courts to adopt a standard of review post-
Heller); Peace, supra note 37, at 181 (discussing the trend among lower courts to apply intermediate 
scrutiny to Second Amendment cases); see also supra note 37 (for differences among standards of 
review). 
 47 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. The non-exhaustive, presumptively lawful list of gun regula-
tions includes: possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places, including schools and government buildings, and conditions and qualifi-
cations on the commercial sale of arms. Id. As opposed to strict scrutiny, which requires that a regula-
tion be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, intermediate scrutiny requires 
only that a regulation be reasonable to achieve an important government interest. See supra note 36. 
Courts have generally chosen intermediate scrutiny because 1) strict scrutiny is inconsistent with Hel-
ler’s presumptively lawful regulations, and 2) it is appropriate in cases where the challenged regula-
tion falls outside of the core right identified in Heller. Kiehl, supra note 4, at 1145–46; Peace, supra 
note 37, at 187 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the preferred standard because it is “restrictive 
enough to strike down a complete ban on handguns, but also permissive enough to justify upholding 
the presumptively lawful restrictions listed in Heller”). 
 48 See, e.g., Drake, 724 F.3d at 440; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97–98. 
 49 735 F.3d 1127, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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lence misdemeanors from possessing firearms for life.50 In Chovan, the Ninth 
Circuit explicitly adopted the two-step Second Amendment analysis undertak-
en by its sister circuits following Heller.51 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed that the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied also depends on a 
separate two-part analysis: (1) “how close the law comes to the core of the 
Second Amendment right,” and (2) “the severity of the law’s burden on the 
right.”52 The court applied intermediate scrutiny, reasoning that the gun regula-
tion substantially burdened the right to bear arms, despite not implicating the 
core Second Amendment right as defined in Heller.53 The Ninth Circuit upheld 
the gun regulation, finding that the government’s objective to prevent domestic 
gun violence was important and the fit between the challenged regulation and 
the asserted objective was reasonable.54 
C. Ninth Circuit Holds “Good Cause” Regulation Unconstitutional: 
Approach in Peruta 
In Peruta, the Ninth Circuit held that San Diego County’s CCW permit-
ting policy was unconstitutional because it denied responsible, law-abiding 
citizens the right to bear arms outside the home for self-defense.55 Following 
the Heller two-part test, the Ninth Circuit held first, that the scope of the right 
to bear arms includes the right to carry a firearm outside the home for purposes 
of lawful self-defense.56 Next, the Ninth Circuit held that the CCW regulation 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 1130; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has 
been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . to ship or transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to 
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”). 
 51 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136; see Drake, 724 F.3d at 440 (applying the Heller two-prong ap-
proach to Second Amendment challenge); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882 (same); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of 
Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(same); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); Heller v. District of Co-
lumbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703–04 
(7th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010) (same). Chovan 
adopted the two-step inquiry that (1) asks whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment and (2) if so, directs courts to apply an appropriate level of scrutiny. See 735 
F.3d at 1136 (“We believe this two-step inquiry reflects the Supreme Court’s holding in Heller that, 
while the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, the scope of that 
right is not unlimited.”). 
 52 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 1139–41. 
 55 See 742 F.3d at 1170–71 (framing the issue as whether “San Diego County policy in light of 
the California licensing scheme as a whole violates the Second Amendment”). 
 56 Id. at 1166 (concluding that the weight of textual and historical authority suggested that the 
right to bear arms included the right to carry weapons outside the home for self-defense); see supra 
Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s two-part analysis in Heller). 
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infringed on that right.57 The Ninth Circuit did not, however, choose to apply a 
particular standard of scrutiny to the regulation, but rather held that the regula-
tion was unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.58 Just as the Supreme 
Court in Heller held that the regulation effected a complete destruction of the 
right to keep and bear arms in the home, the Ninth Circuit held that San Diego 
County’s regulation, within the state-wide regulatory scheme, effected a com-
plete destruction of the right of a law-abiding citizen to bear arms outside the 
home for self-defense.59 
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority’s broad framing of the Sec-
ond Amendment right at issue.60 For the dissent, the issue was more narrow: 
whether the Second Amendment protects the concealed carrying of handguns 
in public, not whether a responsible, law-abiding citizen has a right under the 
Second Amendment to carry a firearm in public for self-defense.61 The dissent 
concluded that carrying a concealed weapon in public was not understood to 
be protected by the Second Amendment at the time of ratification.62 Therefore, 
the dissent found the right asserted by plaintiffs fell outside the scope of the 
Second Amendment, and that the gun regulation was constitutional.63 Even if 
the good cause requirement implicated the Second Amendment, the dissent 
argued it would pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny.64 A pe-
tition for rehearing en banc is currently pending.65 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN 
PRECEDENT AND SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE 
The appropriate approach for a court to take is twofold: 1) exercise judi-
cial restraint by recognizing that, without further guidance from the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1169. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the “good cause” CCW regula-
tion limited the exercise of the core Second Amendment right to public carry to “a few people, in a 
few places, at a few times,” and denied the typical law-abiding citizen from bearing arms in public for 
self-defense. See id. at 1168–70. 
 58 Id. at 1175–76 (“Because our analysis paralleled the analysis in Heller itself, we did not apply a 
particular standard of heightened scrutiny . . . .”); see supra note 37 (discussing the standards of re-
view for constitutional challenges). 
 59 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175–76 (“Such regulations affecting a destruction of the right . . . cannot 
be sustained under any standard of scrutiny.”). 
 60 Id. at 1179 (Thomas, J. dissenting). In Judge Thomas’s dissent, he criticizes the majority for its 
“sweeping decision that unnecessarily decides questions not presented.” Id. 
 61 Id. at 1179–80 (“In this changing landscape, with many questions unanswered, our role as a 
lower court is ‘narrow and constrained by precedent,’ and our task ‘is simply to apply the test an-
nounced by Heller to the challenged provisions.” (quoting Heller v. Dist. of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 
1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). 
 62 Id. at 1191. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Amici Curiae California Police Chiefs’ Association and 
California Peace Officers’ Association at 2, Peruta, 742 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-56971). 
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Court, the core of the Second Amendment right is limited to the home, and 2) 
apply intermediate scrutiny to determine the extent to which the gun regulation 
burdens the right to bear arms in public.66 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit’s broad extension of Second Amendment protections outside the 
home in Peruta v. County of San Diego is a zealous leap of faith from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s narrow holding in District of Colombia v. Heller.67 The Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusion that San Diego’s CCW regulatory scheme is analogous to 
a complete ban on handguns in the home, and therefore constitutes a complete 
destruction of the right to bear arms in public for self-defense, may be over-
stated and does not align with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heller.68 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Heller, that the core of the Second 
Amendment right is the right to keep and bear arms in defense of hearth and 
home, was deliberately narrow and it is not the role of a lower court to expand 
that right.69 After engaging in a skewed textual and historical analysis, the 
Second Circuit concluded that carrying a handgun in public for self-defense is 
a central, core component of the Second Amendment.70 In doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit expanded the scope of Second Amendment protections and dramatical-
ly reduced California’s ability to regulate guns in public.71 Criticizing deci-
sions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Fourth Cir-
cuits, the Ninth Circuit claimed that its sister circuits failed to comprehend that 
gun regulations could not enjoin a law-abiding citizen from carrying a handgun 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text. 
 67 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 
F.3d 1144, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (majority opinion). 
 68 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175. In Heller, the Supreme Court deliberate-
ly chose not to define the scope of the Second Amendment right beyond the home. See 554 U.S. at 
635; Megan Ruebsamen, The Gun-Shy Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in Post-
Heller Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 60 (2013) (noting that instead of 
defining the constitutional scope of gun control legislation, “Heller deliberately set a controlled pace 
of defining Second Amendment rights”). Therefore, the implied message from Heller for lower courts 
is to practice judicial restraint when defining the scope of a right that has such serious ramifications on 
public safety. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Ruebsamen, supra, at 60. 
 69 See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175. In its historical analysis of the scope of the Second Amendment, 
the Ninth Circuit divided interpretations of the Second Amendment into three categories: 1) authori-
ties that recognized bearing arms for self-defense to be an individual right; 2) authorities that recog-
nized bearing arms for a purpose other than self-defense to be an individual right; and 3) authorities 
that did not recognize the right to bear arms as an individual right (collective rights theory). Id. at 
1155–56. Based on its reading of Heller, the Ninth Circuit expressly afforded weight only to authori-
ties that recognized bearing arms for self-defense to be an individual right. Id. at 1166. By doing so, 
the Ninth Circuit skewed its historical analysis and its resulting conclusion regarding the scope of the 
Second Amendment. See id. 
 71 See id. The Ninth Circuit’s eager approach to extend the scope of the Second Amendment di-
rectly conflicts with the Fourth Circuit’s prudent approach, which stated in dicta: “We do not wish to 
be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of our 
judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights.” United States v. Masciandaro, 
638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
62 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
in public for self-defense.72 The Ninth Circuit’s misstep was analogizing the 
complete ban on handguns in the home in Heller with the good cause CCW 
regulation at issue in Peruta—they have drastically different implications on 
the exercise of Second Amendment rights.73 Had the Ninth Circuit followed 
the implied guidance of the Supreme Court in Heller and exercised judicial 
restraint when extending the scope of the Second Amendment beyond the 
home, it would come to a different conclusion regarding the burden of the 
CCW regulations on that right.74 
Further, expanding the core of the Second Amendment right outside the 
home would bring the scope of the right in direct conflict with the presump-
tively lawful gun regulations espoused in Heller.75 The Ninth Circuit failed to 
follow its own precedent in United States v. Chovan by expanding the scope of 
the Second Amendment right.76 In Chovan, the Ninth Circuit adopted the view 
that the core Second Amendment right as defined in Heller was the right to 
keep and bear arms in defense of the home.77 The court declined to extend the 
scope of that right to bearing arms in public.78 Additionally, the Chovan court 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a gun regulation that affected an individual’s 
right to bear arms in public because it did not implicate the core of the Second 
Amendment right but rather only substantially burdened the right to bear 
arms.79 The Peruta majority does not address why it declined to follow its own 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175; see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
422 (2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 73 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170. Even within the California regulatory scheme that completely 
bans the open carry of a firearm, the “good cause” CCW regulation cannot be characterized as a 
“complete ban” on carrying a firearm in public. See id. Whereas the D.C. ban on firearms in the home 
at issue in Heller may accurately be characterized as a “complete destruction” of the Second Amend-
ment right because it enjoined every law-abiding citizen from keeping and bearing a gun in the home, 
the “good cause” CCW regulation cannot be characterized as a complete destruction of the right be-
cause law-abiding citizens could still apply for and obtain a permit to carry a concealed gun in public. 
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170; cf. Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. 1:09-
CV-1482 (FJS), 2014 WL 3702854, at *7 (D.D.C. July 24, 2014) (holding that the District of Colum-
bia’s “blanket prohibition” on the public carry of loaded handguns outside the home was clearly un-
constitutional). 
 74 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175; see also supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text (noting the implied guidance from the Heller Court for lower courts to practice judicial re-
straint when defining the scope of the Second Amendment). 
 75 See infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
 76 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013); supra Part III.B (for discus-
sion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chovan). 
 77 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (“Heller tells us that the core of the Second Amendment is the ‘right 
of the law-abiding, responsible citizen to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”). 
 78 Id. The Chovan court held that the gun regulation preventing possession by criminals did not 
implicate this core Second Amendment right to use guns in defense of hearth and home. Id. 
 79 Id. at 1139; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the standards of review for 
constitutional challenges). 
2015] An Overextension of the Scope of the Second Amendment 63 
precedent in Chovan.80 Indeed, by extending the core right of the Second 
Amendment to public carry, the right directly conflicts with the presumptively 
lawful regulations espoused in Heller.81 That is not to say that the right to bear 
arms in public for self-defense is not protected by the Second Amendment, it is 
just not the core of the right as envisioned by the Heller Court.82 
Moreover, the appropriate standard to apply is intermediate scrutiny be-
cause it allows a Court to strike a balance between the individual right to bear 
arms and lawful gun regulation for public safety.83 By failing to apply a partic-
ular standard of heightened scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit in Peruta conflates the 
requirements to satisfy intermediate scrutiny with strict scrutiny in its critique 
of its sister circuits.84 The Ninth Circuit claims that had the Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits applied intermediate scrutiny correctly, the gun regulations 
would have been held unconstitutional.85 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was 
that the state in each of these cases failed to “demonstrate sufficient narrow 
tailoring” of the gun regulation to the government’s aim of public safety.86 Un-
der intermediate scrutiny, however, the regulation only need be reasonably re-
lated to the government objective.87 Although the Ninth Circuit claimed that 
the good cause CCW regulation failed to pass any standard of scrutiny, the 
standard it actually applied was strict scrutiny.88 Strict scrutiny has been reject-
ed by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits when dealing with Second 
Amendment challenges and should be rejected by the Ninth Circuit if a rehear-
ing en banc is granted and in subsequent cases.89 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1194 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“Rather than employing the straightforward 
methodology prescribed by Chovan, the majority wanders off in a different labyrinthian path, both in 
its analysis of the Second Amendment right at issue and its analysis of the government regulation in 
question.”). 
 81 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. For instance, a core constitutional right to carry a handgun in 
public would directly conflict with a law forbidding guns in a school zone. See id. As the Fourth Cir-
cuit noted, the extension of the core right to public carry “portend[s] all sorts of litigation over 
schools, airports, parks, public thoroughfares, and various additional government facilities.” Masci-
andaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (4th Cir. 2011). The presumptively lawful gun regulation would have to be 
struck down as an unconstitutional infringement on the right to bear arms in public, and federal and 
state governments would be hard-pressed to pass any gun regulation that would not burden that right. 
See id. at 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 82 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 83 See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
 84 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1176–78 (majority opinion); Drake, 724 F.3d at 440; Woollard, 712 
F.3d at 882; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97–98. 
 85 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1178. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1178. 
 89 See, e.g., Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96–97; 
United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2009) aff’d, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 
2010) (stating that the Heller Court’s willingness to presume the validity of several types of gun regu-
lations is inconsistent with the adoption of a strict scrutiny standard of review); see also Lawrence 
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CONCLUSION 
In Peruta v. County of San Diego, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit greatly expanded the scope of the Second Amendment in their analysis 
of a constitutional challenge to a good cause CCW regulation. In District of 
Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately defined the core of 
the Second Amendment narrowly as the right to keep and bear arms in the 
home for self-defense. By failing to exercise judicial restraint, the Ninth Cir-
cuit extended that core right to cover bearing arms in public for self-defense, 
and failed to apply the appropriate means-ends scrutiny in holding the CCW 
regulation unconstitutional. In a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit panel 
should exercise restraint and not extend the core of the Second Amendment 
right outside the home. Going forward, the Ninth Circuit should follow the 
precedent it set in U.S. v. Chovan, and the trend of its sister circuits, and cor-
rectly apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the good cause CCW 
regulation unconstitutionally infringes that right. 
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